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‘Tension’, both as a concept and as an empirical phenomenon, consti-
tutes a topic of enquiry which will strike anyone by its amplitude. This 
characteristic alone is sufficient ground to decline any invitation of tack-
ling the problem of its meaning and bearing in a single essay. Hence, the 
present investigation will be limited to the more specific question of 
the relevance of the notion of tension to describe and classify a selected 
number of models of society proposed by social and political think-
ers. What happens to their understandings of life in common when we 
try to approach them from the perspective of tension? And, conversely: 
what happens to our conceptualizations of tension if we approach ten-
sion with the methods and from the standpoint of social and political 
theory? I will suggest that concepts and images such as force, conflict, 
equilibrium, as well as a few others, lend themselves to be understood 
as metaphors of tension. Such a statement, of course, is predicated upon 
a specific notion of what we should understand by ‘tension’. It is to this 
question that I turn first.
I.
It seems impossible to conceptualize tension without mobilizing the cat-
egory of relation. If I start in imagination with zero or one element, I 
quickly observe that the conceptual space required for thinking tension 
withers away, and that notions such as emptiness, oneness, or fullness 
arise instead. To form an idea of tension, I need to posit at least two 
elements between which a tension may develop. Moreover, the poten-
tial for tension-building comes from the fact that the two elements do 
not exist in complete isolation but are susceptible of entering into some 
kind of relation. Tension, however, does not seem to be simply syn-
onymous with any kind of relation or interaction. To arrive at a more 
specific understanding of tension, we need to perceive the two or more 
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elements we have posited as standing in a determinate kind of relation: 
a relation that involves a force. For instance, the two limbs of a bow are 
in a relation merely by belonging to the weapon itself; but they are said 
to be in a relation of tension because we have bent the bow by means of 
a string. The force used in this process remains present in the object in 
the form of the tension of the string, which is also the tension between 
the two tips of the bow. This example illuminates a further point: that 
relation plus force is still insufficient to arrive at an understanding of 
tension satisfactory for our purposes. In a bow, a tension can be said 
to exist because there are not one, but two forces: very loosely put, the 
string ‘pulls’ and the limbs ‘resist’. In other words, if there is only one 
force in a relation, or several forces which have the same direction, we 
would hardly have a tension at all. One last point that I wish to make 
at the outset is that the more interesting forms of tension involve forces 
that are roughly commensurable. Let us indeed imagine again two ele-
ments caught in a relation involving forces, and let us assume that one 
of the forces is extremely large, so that the counter-force of the thing or 
subject upon which the force is exerted is, all things considered, neg-
ligible. To come back to the previous example, we can envision that 
we bend the bow with such vigour that the weapon breaks in two: the 
tension that had built up for an instant is suddenly released from the 
relation, and the relation itself breaks. In such a case, the tension is so 
ephemeral that it is inapplicable as a figure for the description of society 
as a relatively stable entity. 
 In my understanding, thus, the phenomenon of tension requires at 
least two elements standing in a relation involving at least two forces 
with different directions. That is, one element exerts a force upon at 
least one different element that happens to be exerting some kind of 
resistance or counter-force. The two forces, although they do not need 
to be of identical magnitude, must at least be commensurable since, as 
just suggested, the presence of a radically superior force would imme-
diately trump all others in an instant, leaving no room for an endur-
ing tension. In the rest of this essay, I will call ‘equilibrium’ the situa-
tion in which the forces exerted are of the same magnitude, so that (as 
suggested by the definition of an equilibrium in physics)1 the total sum 
of the forces is zero. We may call ‘collapse’, or ‘dissolving relation’, 
the situation wherein the sum of the forces is not zero (without any 
1 I am grateful to Silvia Casalino for the clarification of this point.
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force being radically superior). In the long run, a collapsing relation 
disappears: the element which was resisting is definitely freed from the 
attraction or force to which it was subjected (resistance was successful), 
or, conversely, the resistance of the element is annihilated and it is either 
modified or destroyed. In the following figure, I have tried to render this 
notion of tension, choosing the specific case of tension as ‘equilibrium’:
In this schema, the two circles represent two subjects, the line around 
them, the existence of a relation between them, the plain arrow the force 
exerted by the subject on the left, and the dotted arrow the resistance 
exerted by the other subject. The two arrows have the same length in 
order to indicate that the two forces have the same magnitude, so that 
the relation depicted here, as mentioned above, is in a state of ‘equilib-
rium’. If, by contrast, one of the forces was larger, that specific relation 
would first develop, and eventually, ‘dissolve’ or ‘collapse’.
 There are a few things that I would like to emphasize at this point. 
First, in my attempt to work out a general concept of tension, my aim 
was primarily to capture some elements that I take to be relevant for 
arriving at a proper understanding of the semantic field occupied by the 
word in everyday language. While I readily admit to have found some 
inspiration in definitions borrowed from mechanics, my interest is not 
to propose a concept of tension that could apply indifferently to both 
the natural and the social world. What I am after here is the figure of 
tension understood as a component of social imaginaries and political 
discourses. In order to grasp this figure and its manifestations (i.e., the 
various forms it may take), it seems necessary to have a sense of what 
it entails, of the elements it is made of: this is precisely what the above 
exercise in conceptualization was seeking to achieve.
 The second point, which is related to the first one, is that my use 
of the concept of force is general and abstract, and to a large extent 
metaphorical. In particular I will not use the word ‘force’, in the context 
of a description of the social world, to refer only to the phenomenon 
of direct physical coercion. I include in my notion of force any means 
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that a subject may use to move another subject to an action he or she 
may not have otherwise undertaken.2 Among such means we find, of 
course, brute physical strength; but in social affairs other ways are at 
the same time more benign and more efficacious, and thus more likely 
to be adopted: means which range from threats to attempts at persua-
sion. Such a broad concept of force, I should add, is customary among 
social and political theorists. Speech act theory, for instance, commonly 
refers to the ‘illocutionary force’ of statements, and defines it as that 
which is done in saying something (the effect the speaker is seeking to 
achieve). What distinguishes warnings, threats, orders, promises, from 
merely descriptive statements is that they entail and (implicitly) express 
an expectation, on the part of the speaker, that the recipient of the mes-
sage will adjust his or her conduct in a certain way (for example, in the 
case of a warning that something heavy enough to cause harm is fall-
ing, the recipient is expected to step out of the trajectory of the object).3 
Similarly, the theoreticians of deliberative democracy do not shy away 
from speaking of the ‘force of the better argument’,4 thereby referring to 
2 Incidentally, the previous sentence corresponds exactly to one of the many pos-
sible definitions of power in political science. See for instance Steven Lukes, 
Power: A Radical View – The Original Text with Two Major New Chapters 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). In other words, ‘force’ is 
in my usage a kind of Oberbegriff, a generic or umbrella term: natural phenom-
ena and animals, but also human beings and their artifacts (such as concepts, 
beliefs, and perhaps institutions) all exert forces. Power, in turn, is the name 
of force when consciously exerted by a human being over another one or over 
a group. For the sake of consistency I will stick to the notion of force in the 
present essay, even though in several cases the concept of power may legitimately 
have been used instead. A consequence of all this is that my distinction below, 
between images of society as tension-free and images of society as tension-rid-
den has some connections with another more familiar one: that between views of 
society as power-ridden or as power-free. However, the two distinctions do not 
fully overlap: an issue to which I will come back in my discussion of Emile Durk-
heim.
3 John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1975). See also Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, 3 vols (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), I: Regarding Method.
4 This is a lose translation of Habermas, who speaks of the ‘zwanglose Zwang des 
besseren Arguments’. The topic of the ‘force of the better argument’ is discussed 
in several essays contained in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Bound-
aries of the Political, ed. by Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1996).
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something which possibly modifies future courses of action: a convinc-
ing argument (i.e., an argument that has ‘force’) transforms the beliefs 
held by subjects and, therefore, the actions such subjects may under-
take.
 The simple, overtly mechanistic, but purely heuristic model pro-
posed here can be useful to interrogate human life in its different man-
ifestations with a view to detect which of them may be described as 
entailing tension. To begin with, it seems that the mind could easily 
be seen as a site of tension. This is especially the case if we take desire 
to be a prominent feature of the condition of most humans, insofar as 
desire can be described as a relation between two states of the subject, 
one of which is exerting a ‘pull’ upon the other one. Moreover these 
two states are separated by time and, most probably, other obstacles as 
well. Another relevant candidate, with which I will be solely concerned 
here, are social relations. One view of them, although of course not 
hegemonic, is quite ingrained in our imaginaries. According to this view, 
society is made of individuals with diverse dispositions who evolve in a 
world of scarce resources. In the pursuit of their goals, they are there-
fore likely 1) to actually enter into some form of (possibly violent) con-
flict, and 2) to expect, and prepare for, the occurrence of such conflicts. 
Both phenomena (actual and expected conflicts) may be seen as tensions 
in the sense proposed above. I will return below to this image of the 
social, which has been depicted, among other authors, by Thomas Hob-
bes. However, it is important for my argument to perceive that not all 
visions of society take tension to be a central component of life in com-
mon: this is the topic of the next section.
II.
Basically, if society is envisaged as a homogeneous whole – i.e. as 
a totality composed of identical elements – then tension cannot eas-
ily build between the parts and, therefore, it also remains absent from 
society as a whole. To further clarify this, we can turn to David Hume’s 
reflection on the conditions of possibility of conflicts, and of politics 
itself as the sum of activities that aim at controlling and regulating 
such conflicts. In his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals he 
described two counter-factual situations in which conflicts, disagree-
ments, or clashing desires, were unlikely to occur. He imagined, on the 
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one hand, a situation where individuals are naturally wholly benevolent: 
‘the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, 
that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no 
more concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows’.5 Given 
such generous dispositions, equality always reigns in the community, 
since benevolent individuals willingly distribute the resources available 
in a perfectly fair way. Because of this equality and of the ties of affec-
tion and respect which bind individuals in such a situation, ‘interest or 
revenge or envy’6 never arise, and all threats against property or physi-
cal safety are thereby prevented from developing. 
 We can re-describe Hume’s spontaneously peaceful society by say-
ing that no tension exists between individuals in this society since they 
all have the same mental dispositions (in this case, friendship and gener-
osity). In other words, all individuals are in agreement concerning what 
the good in life may consist in, and undertake actions that are conducive 
to roughly similar goals. I do not need to constrain or convince others 
to act in a given way since, guided by values and beliefs comparable 
to mine, they automatically act in a way that I find acceptable. Fur-
thermore, we can probably generalize Hume’s intuition and affirm that 
the existence of any unanimously shared belief or value system results 
in a society that is to a large extent deprived of tension. To prevent 
misunderstandings, I need to make it clear that I am thinking here not 
just of similar mental dispositions in general, but specifically of similar 
substantive world-views. We can easily imagine a society in which all 
members may be described as similar because they are all convinced of 
the legitimacy of pursuing their individual interests (whatever these may 
be). In this case however, while all individual minds are similar from the 
perspective of their ‘form’ or ‘functioning’, each one of these minds may 
become filled with a different content, i.e. be animated by idiosyncratic 
goals and preferences. As it shall become clear later on – after my dis-
cussion of some aspects of Hobbes’s political thought – we have good 
reasons to think that such a society would not be deprived of tension. 
5 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by Jerome B. 
Schneewind (Indianapolis-Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 1983), p. 21. Note, in this 
quote, how Hume uses a vocabulary emphasizing fullness (‘replete’, ‘utmost’; 
see also, in the quote below, the use of the phrase ‘fully provided’): this seems to 
confirm my intuition that the metaphor of tension and the vocabulary of fullness 
and oneness are mutually exclusive.
6 Ibid., p. 43.
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What would reduce tension, I claim, is the existence of shared substan-
tive goals: for instance, in the vocabulary of political theory, the exist-
ence of a unanimous concept of the good life. 
 A consideration of the history of social and political thought does 
indeed suggest a connection between unity and homogeneity. In fact, 
most theories which emphasize the unity and harmony of society have 
understood this unity as resting on the identity of the composing parts, 
or at least on the identity of the parts in some particularly significant 
respects (such as beliefs and values held), while elements seen as less 
defining (such as preferences or functions), are allowed to vary. Among 
these models of society we can rank most nationalisms (especially those 
of the ‘ethnic’ kind),7 but also culturalist theories of the social,8 as well 
as some specific political imaginaries such as those of the Soviet bloc, 
whose ruling parties were fascinated by the image of the ‘People-as-One’ 
(Peuple-un), as Claude Lefort has argued:9 a community of producers 
standing as a man to fulfil the demands of history. What all these mod-
els have in common is the conviction that all individuals have, by and 
large, the same mental dispositions, the same beliefs, ideals, and goals. 
For this reason they all look, so to speak, in the same direction and 
spontaneously act in a consonant way. While conflicts may arise, they 
are taken to be easily resolvable (especially by way of an invocation of 
the higher values held in this model by all individuals), so that tension is 
seen as a marginal and even pathological phenomenon of social life, and 
not as one of its distinctive features. 
 Hume further devised another model of society which, while dis-
pensing with the assumption of an identity of all members of society, 
7 For an influential statement on the difference between two understandings of the 
nation – the civic, i.e. voluntaristic, and ethnic, i.e. objectivist one –, see Hans 
Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 
1955). On homogeneity as the distinctive creed of nationalism, see Ernest Gell-
ner, Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on the Past (London: Blackwell, 
1983).
8 For a presentation and critique of such theories, which understand culture as 
a personality type shared by all members of society, see Anne Swidler, ‘Culture 
in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review, 51.2 (April 
1986), pp. 273-86; William H. Sewell, Jr., ‘Geertz, Cultural Systems, and His-
tory: From Synchrony to Transformation’, Representations, 59 (Summer 1997), 
pp. 35-55.
9 Claude Lefort, ‘L’image du corps et le totalitarisme’, in L’invention démocra-
tique: Les limites de la domination totalitaire (Paris: Fayard, 1981).
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was free of tension in the sense given here to this term. He conjured up 
a state of 
profuse abundance of all external conveniencies, that, without any uncer-
tainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individ-
ual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites 
can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire.10 
In such a ‘happy state’, Hume argued, conflicts between individuals 
are unlikely to arise at all (be it only because the institution of prop-
erty is superfluous here), so that the use of force or constraint is rarely 
required. While that state of complete abundance is hypothetical, Hume 
did believe that in some parts of the earth goods were, in fact, more 
readily available than in his homeland, or less needed (such as cloth-
ing or shelter in warm countries). He suggested that in milder climates, 
‘fewer quarrels are likely to arise’ among individuals, and there is ‘less 
necessity […] for a settled police or regular authority to protect and 
defend them from foreign enemies, or from each other’.11 In this state of 
abundance, individuals may well be diverse – some may prefer to drink 
wine and others non-alcoholic fruit juices; or some, less superficially, 
may want to build sports stadiums and others libraries or temples. Such 
diversity, however, does not lead to conflict, since the perfect abundance 
of things allows ex hypothesi for the realization of all desires anyway: 
land and building stones, for example, are infinitely available so that 
millions of stadiums, libraries, and temples may arise side by side, to the 
equal satisfaction of sport fans, bibliophiles, and religious fanatics. 
 The notion that the ability to fulfil material desires efficiently leads 
to a peaceful, harmonious society is part and parcel of the social theory 
of the advocates of the integral market. On the one hand, these authors 
do assume that individuals have strong desires, so that some tension 
is always present in commercial societies in the form of the attraction 
subjects feel for certain goods and services. On the other hand, however, 
a well-functioning market enables subjects to satisfy their desires easily 
so that the resistance, which is characteristic of tension in the model 
proposed above, is absent. Moreover, the proponents of the integral 
market, for instance Friedrich von Hayek, typically seek to demonstrate 
10 Hume, Enquiry, p. 21.
11 David Hume, ‘Of commerce’, in Political Writings, ed. by Knud Haakonssen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 104.
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that commercial societies are peaceful entities, and are devoid, except in 
abnormal cases, of force and coercion. Even though the state must be 
present to guarantee the enforcement of contracts, the overall picture 
is that of a society which tends towards some form of good balance, 
or spontaneous order (for which Hayek proposed the name of ‘catal-
laxy’).12
 It may be useful to add that Hume’s second model (like the first 
one, but for different reasons) is a fairly optimistic one, insofar as it 
assumes that the fulfilment of material desires tends to appease individ-
ual appetites enough to strongly reduce most opportunities for conflict. 
We could instead legitimately imagine that, regardless of the fulfilment 
of such desires, individuals may remain unsatisfied all the same. They 
may, indeed, desire things that no material abundance is ever likely to 
procure. For instance, the bibliophiles may be of the opinion that the 
preoccupations of sport fans are futile and ought therefore to be banned. 
Less extremely, they may tolerate sports as long as their adepts explicitly 
recognize, by some kind of pledge of allegiance, the moral superiority 
of reading. In other words some desires – such as the desire for recogni-
tion, or the desire to be true to one’s God – are not easy to satisfy, even 
when material resources are abundant.13 Therefore Hume’s model, of a 
society deprived of tension because resources are abundant, only makes 
sense provided that we also assume that individuals desire first and fore-
most material satisfaction, so that other, ideal desires arise only, as it 
were, as sublimations of unfulfilled material or biological needs.
 It is probably no exaggeration to say that the idea of a society 
devoid of tensions, of society as a tightly sutured whole, or as a per-
fectly executed symphony, has haunted and continues to haunt our 
social and political imaginaries. It seems to be a common feature of as 
12 See, among other writings, Friedrich von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 
(London: Routledge, 2006). 
13 These examples are not given at random, but allude to the fact that many clas-
sical political thinkers, including Hobbes, Rousseau, as well as Hume himself, 
took religion (especially of the Catholic variety) and the striving for recognition 
as the two most common causes of social strife. Their political theories entail 
proposals to cope with this problem. Rousseau, for one, spoke of a strong cul-
ture of equality and of civil religion as possible solutions to the second and first 
dangers mentioned here, respectively. On the culture of equality, see Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Du contrat social, in Ecrits politiques (Paris: Gallimard – Pléiade, 
1964), Book II, ch. 4; and on civil religion, Book IV, ch. 8.
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different visions of the social as Plato’s philosophers’ state, More’s uto-
pia, Rousseau’s republic (at least in some readings), or the commercial 
society advocated by Adam Smith and Benjamin Constant, that har-
mony reigns in them. Harmony must be understood here as a situation 
where each part not only plays the role for which he or she is best suited 
and receives his or her due; but also is aware, on the basis of a shared 
vision of society, of playing the right role and of receiving the proper 
amount (this is the dimension of substantive identity, discussed above). 
When these two elements are present, frictions and tensions in the form 
of conflicts of attribution, overlapping claims, dissatisfaction concern-
ing one’s social position, and the like, are envisaged as easily avoidable. 
In this vision of the social, conversely, the appearance of such frictions 
is taken as a sure sign that the community is on a path of corruption. 
Social conflicts and tensions, thus, are understood as diseases of life in 
common.
III.
We can now move on to describe some models of society that put ten-
sion at the core of life in common. If we try to apply the model of ten-
sion delineated above to conceptualize society, we observe that we are 
led towards a pluralist and conflictual understanding of the social, i.e. 
a conception which starts by assuming that a variety of social subjects 
with contrasting or even incompatible preferences, desires, beliefs, 
world-views, exist on a given territory. This is the situation that con-
temporary political theorists describe as pluralism. From John Stuart 
Mill and Max Weber to Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas or 
William Connolly, pluralism is understood as a basic condition of mod-
ern society: a situation in which the diversity of individuals and groups 
is so wide-ranging and deeply-seated that any hope of overcoming the 
differences of world-views is a mere fancy of the mind.14
14 Of course, in spite of this common view, the authors mentioned differ markedly 
in their normative evaluation of the basic situation of pluralism. The position 
they hold concerning the best way to cope with diversity may even take the form 
of a proposal (in the case of Rawls and Habermas) to supersede pluralism by 
establishing a consensus at a higher, more abstract, meta-level. On this idea, 
see John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer, ‘Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as 
Political Ideals’, American Journal of Political Science, 50.3 (2006), pp. 634-49.
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 As many of these authors observe,15 one of the earliest and most 
influential depictions of the fact and problem of pluralism is the one 
proposed by Thomas Hobbes. Incidentally, this philosopher’s mecha-
nistic social ontology lends itself particularly well, as we shall see, to 
being formalized along the lines proposed above. Humans, according 
to Hobbes, are beings who strive after what they believe to be good (for 
them): ‘in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, 
a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely 
in Death’.16 Power is the situation wherein one can obtain subjectively 
defined goods.17 Among these goods, one finds not only material advan-
tage, but also reputation or recognition by others, which Hobbes called 
glory.18 Because they are creatures filled with desires, human beings 
also naturally want what is the primary condition of possibility of such 
desires, namely self-preservation. Another crucial feature of the Hob-
besian human condition is that individuals are roughly equal in intelli-
gence and strength: ‘Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of 
body, and mind’.19
 Hobbes imagined, under the name of the ‘state of nature’, what 
would happen if individuals with such characteristics were integrally 
left to themselves, i.e. were deprived of social rules and institutions. 
Such individuals would not a priori have any shared notion of right and 
wrong: Hobbes’s conviction, inherited from theological voluntarism,20 
was that value emerges from the decision of a superior, so that in the 
state of nature – where no one is superior – there are as many rights and 
wrongs as there are individuals. All individuals are therefore morally 
free to ensure their self-preservation at the cost of others, and are mor-
ally free to pursue any desire without paying attention to the desires of 
15 See for instance John Rawls ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 7.1 (Spring 1987), pp. 1-25, esp. p. 23.
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2008), p. 70.
17 Ibid., p. 62.
18 Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 23; Leviathan, p. 88.
19 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 86.
20 Cf. Jerome B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern 
Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 84 and 
95-100. See also Michael A. Gillespie, ‘The Theological Origins of Modernity’, 
Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 13.1 (1999), pp. 1-30.
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others. In such circumstances, since individuals have, if not unlimited, 
at least numerous and ever-recurring desires, each subject is a threat to 
every other subject. The inter-individual relations of the state of nature, 
thus, are characterized at best by phenomena such as diffidence, mutual 
surveillance and fear (especially, as Hobbes never tired of repeating: 
‘fear of death’), and, at worst, by the recourse to violence.
 In the state of nature, individuals continuously exert a force against 
other individuals, and these latter individuals in turn resist it (and also 
exert a force upon other individuals). Since, as we have seen, the forces 
that individuals possess are roughly equal (that is, in the vocabulary 
introduced above, commensurable) one can legitimately qualify the 
state of nature as a fundamentally tension-ridden situation. Further-
more, given that no individual can be expected to take the upper hand 
over a large number of his peers on account of an intrinsic physical or 
mental superiority, it may be tempting to assume that this situation may 
stabilize into a form of social equilibrium (a kind of generalized ‘stand-
off’), in which individuals keep from actual fighting for fear of being 
defeated. However, Hobbes does not seem to have conceived the state 
of nature in such a way. To begin with, many individuals, according to 
Hobbes, would happily break the stand-off situation to engage in direct 
fighting: this is because they overestimate their own force (they are, in 
Hobbes’s vocabulary, ‘vainglorious’).21 Even more modest individuals 
would probably fail to find a way ‘to enjoy [...] in common or divide’22 
something they all simultaneously desire. Hobbes had this pessimistic 
view of language which led him to state that ‘the mere act of disagree-
ment is offensive’,23 so that discussions or negotiations to regulate access 
to given goods easily turn into overt conflict. For this reason, as Hob-
bes emphasized, the state of nature is necessarily a state of war of all 
against all. All this strongly suggests that inter-individual relations, in 
the state of nature, tend to ‘collapse’ or ‘dissolve’ (in the sense indicated 
above), because they all lead to fighting, and because fighting results in 
one of the parties escaping or being slain. Moreover, victors are further 
threatened by other individuals so that ‘it is a miracle if even the strong-
est survives to die of years and old age’.24 In view of all this, we must 
21 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 72.
22 Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 27.
23 Ibid., p. 26.
24 Ibid., p. 30.
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describe Hobbes’s state of nature, not as an equilibrium, but as a situ-
ation in which tensions permanently dissolve and re-emerge, involving 
each time different elements.
 In Hobbes’s state of nature, tension takes various shapes. There is 
first tension in the psychological sense of desire, which propels individu-
als forward towards objects and inspires actions that may induce the 
admiration or respect or fear of others. We could perhaps call ‘excite-
ment’ this particular form of tension. There is also tension in violent 
conflicts, i.e. tension in the form of a use of physical strength to ensure 
one’s control over coveted objects. Lastly, there is tension in the form 
of an expectation or presentiment, on the part of individuals, that they 
may encounter possibly life-threatening resistance in the pursuit of their 
goals, which is the source of insecurity and fear. If we had to choose a 
name for this experience of tension, we could call it ‘intensity’.25
IV.
The forms of tension I have just enumerated all have something in com-
mon: they appear within a single plane; they are horizontal, insofar as 
they occur either within the subject or between two or more equivalent 
subjects. By contrast, in Hobbes’s civil society, the relations between 
individuals take a different shape, given that all of them must now fac-
tor in the possible intervention of a third, a subject unlike any other 
standing tall above society: the Leviathan.
 Hobbes’s state is constituted by way of a compact among individu-
als who all equally seek protection from the violence of each: ‘men agree 
amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, vol-
untarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others’.26 An 
absolute, indivisible power is thereby established, endowed with a force 
that shall check the forces of all subjects. Individuals still possess infinite 
25 I take ‘intensity’ in the sense just indicated to be closely related to ‘suspense’, 
which is an expectation or presentiment, on the part of the recipient of a work of 
art of some kind, that the fictional character is about to meet resistance, usually 
of a violent kind, but whose exact timing and form is left uncertain. My sugges-
tion, therefore, is to speak of intensity when the subject expects to personally 
encounter resistance, and of suspense when he or she expects others to meet 
resistance, and thus takes on the role of a mere observer or spectator.
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 96.
S O C I A L  F O R C E S
 
 198
desires, but they refrain from certain courses of action for fear of being 
punished by the sovereign. Because he has armed forces at his disposal, 
the sovereign is physically and materially superior to the members of 
society, so that the threat of his intervention is sufficient to counter-bal-
ance the reckless acquisitive and destructive tendencies of individuals. 
In other words, the emergence of the state establishes an equilibrium in 
society: the various forces involved in the relations between individuals 
are constrained by the presence of an absolute, superior force (that of 
the sovereign). John Rawls, among others, emphasized that Hobbes’s 
political theory could be indeed described as favouring equilibrium: 
‘the Hobbesian strand of liberalism’ envisages social life as resting on 
‘a modus vivendi secured by a convergence of self- and group-interests 
as coordinated and balanced by well-designed constitutional arrange-
ments’.27 And he added that this view of society as a mere equilibrium 
revealed much too thin an understanding of social life: ‘social unity is 
only apparent as its stability is contingent on circumstances remaining 
such as not to upset the fortunate convergence of interests. [...] stability 
does depend on happenstance and a balance of relative forces’.28
 The appearance of the Leviathan is interesting for the topic with 
which I am dealing here in that it introduces a highly relevant figure, 
or metaphor, of tension. In the state of nature, as stated above, tensions 
exist in the form of contradictory yet commensurable forces between 
subjects. But this situation changes in the civil state. Subjects, of course, 
may still try to influence the behaviour of other (usually reluctant) sub-
jects, though now predominantly by peaceful means. Therefore tension 
is still present in social relations. And yet, the situation is more complex 
since subjects, in their reasoning – that is, in their reflection about the 
means that are appropriate to reach their ends –, must take into account 
27 Rawls, ‘Consensus’, p. 23.
28 Ibid., p. 11. As a matter of fact, Hobbes himself was well aware of the lack of 
solidity in his construction. He believed that numerous phenomena could con-
tribute to the erosion of the authority of the sovereign and was consequently 
very concerned that his logic of absolute sovereignty may prove insufficient to 
efficiently tame inter-individual conflicts. For this reason, we could perhaps 
describe Hobbes’s civil state as a situation of progressive collapse, more than as 
a situation of equilibrium. On the pessimism of Hobbes concerning the stability 
of political institutions, see David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas 
Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1989). 
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not only the reaction of other subjects, but also the reaction of the sov-
ereign, who may intervene, at his entire discretion, to preserve peace. 
Put differently, all social relations are, at a minimum, made of two kinds 
of tensions: horizontal tensions between subjects, and vertical tensions 
between the subjects and the sovereign. 
 I take this notion concerning the multiple layers of tension to be 
momentous, as it introduces a notion of society as a space in which the 
relations between individuals are not direct, but always mediated by 
something external to the relations themselves. In all social relations a 
(preexisting) third is present, which contributes to giving them shape. 
This is what the following figure is trying to indicate:
The nature of this third can be variously envisaged, but it is uncontro-
versial that language may be mentioned here as an example, with laws, 
collective representations, culture, symbols, rules, imaginaries, as fur-
ther possible names and notions of something that individuals refer to, 
rely upon, and mobilize in their actions and interactions.
 It may be worthwhile to spell out in more detail what I am trying 
to convey. According to Hobbes, individuals envisage certain courses of 
action as possible and rule out others on the basis, among other things, 
of the subjective calculation of their chances of success, which must 
involve a consideration of the likeliness of punishment. In other words, 
they must take into account, in their actions, the existence of laws as 
well as of institutions, which promulgate and enforce them. By gen-
eralizing this notion and removing its characteristic rationalistic and 
voluntaristic bend, we arrive at a conception of the institutional and 
cultural embeddedness of social action. In order to further substanti-
ate this conception, we can turn to the work of Emile Durkheim.29 In 
29 For a more detailed presentation of Durkheim’s position, which is hereafter only 
briefly sketched, see Jean Terrier, ‘Die Verortung der Gesellschaft: Durkheims 
Verwendung des Begriffs “Substrat” ’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 19.2 (June 
2009), pp. 181-204.
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his attempt to account for the fact that individuals are shaped by the 
cultural environment in which they have been socialized, Durkheim re-
elaborated the traditional notions of force and constraint with a view to 
sever them from the rationalistic individualism of classical social ontolo-
gies. He defined social facts as ‘manners of acting, thinking, and feeling 
external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by 
virtue of which they exercise control over him’.30 Durkheim indicated 
three modes of operation of social constraint: a certain form of behav-
iour can become prevalent 1) because of the threat of formal sanctions; 
2) because of informal, communal sanctions such as mockery, laugh-
ter, or reprobation; and 3) because of individual ‘internal tendencies’,31 
which Durkheim sometimes called ‘the force of habit’.32 The first form 
of constraint is easy to understand, insofar as it is clearly reminiscent of 
the classical external force exercised by the state’s coercive apparatus, 
discussed above. However, Durkheim also emphasized that collective 
institutions, including the state, possessed a social authority that com-
manded a form of obedience motivated not only by self-interest, but 
also by the recognition of a superior moral standing. The second form 
of constraint can be understood in the following way: through myri-
ads of signs (smiles, looks, shrugs, winks, explicit words of encourage-
ment, or dissuasion with corresponding tones of voice, etc.), individu-
als pursuing given courses of action are permanently reminded of their 
social and cultural appropriateness, and thus guided, possibly against 
their own preferences, towards predefined forms of behaviour.33 The 
important element is that these signs are not a reflection of the subjec-
tive preferences of the individuals who emit them. Rather, such indi-
viduals merely rely upon, make explicit, and reproduce obligatory social 
norms of appropriateness which, as Durkheim emphasized, are external 
to them. Such norms are the expression of collective representations, of 
social ‘ideals’. 
30 Emile Durkheim, Les règles de la méthode sociologique (Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 2007), p. 4; emphases mine, JT. The translation is from The 
Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method, 
ed. by Steven Lukes (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001), p. 52.
31 Durkheim, Règles, pp. 4-8.
32 Ibid., p. 91.
33 I take the third form of constraint to be merely an internalization, a ‘becoming 
habitual’, of the expectation of the sanctions of the second kind.
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 Indeed, according to Durkheim, social subjects possess in their 
minds two kinds of representations: individual and specific ones, on 
the one hand; and collective ones, on the other, which are intuitively 
perceived as having a distinct quality, as being greater, nobler, worthier 
than those of the first kind. (In part, this ‘greatness’ has something to 
do with the fact that these representations pertain to the more consider-
able aspects of life in common, such as religious, scientific or political 
ideas, as opposed to particular needs and preferences.) Collective rep-
resentations endow individuals with a sense of the values shared by the 
collective, with a notion of what is appropriate and what is not, with a 
feeling of right and wrong. Moreover, these values, notions and feelings 
are not merely things that individuals ‘know’; they are part of a deeper 
mental level, the level of strongly held beliefs, ingrained habits and fun-
damental categories. Because of this they are very effective in inspiring 
and orientating action, in forcing individuals into determinate forms of 
conduct.34
 A few remarks deserve to be made on this conception of the social. 
To begin with, we may wonder how this social theory relates to the 
main topic of this essay. The answer is that Durkheim’s society can be 
described as inhabited by a permanent tension: we have indeed here the 
notion of a force (the authority of the social values that make up col-
lective consciousness) which is exerted upon a variety of subordinate 
elements (the consciousness of individuals). This creates what deserves 
to be called, quite appropriately, a tension between the individual and 
the collective. Durkheim himself concretely described many instances of 
such tensions: for example, he spoke of the tension between the require-
ments of the division of labour, which demands collaboratively-minded 
individuals, and the often flinching motivation of manual workers, who 
are condemned to repetitive, unsatisfying tasks.35
 Second, these brief considerations on Durkheim’s sociology show 
that the contrasting visions of society as either tension-ridden or ten-
34 Durkheim went even as far as to affirm that our very concept of force is sim-
ply a transposition of our experience of the authority of social representations 
and institutions. Cf. Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (Paris: Alcan, 
1912), pp. 522-23. On this, see Anne W. Rawls, ‘Durkheim’s Epistemology: The 
Neglected Argument’, American Journal of Sociology, 102.2 (September 1996), 
pp. 430-82.
35 Emile Durkheim, De la division du travail social (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1991), esp. part III, chap. II.
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sion-free do not fully overlap with another opposition – the opposi-
tion, namely, between visions of society that stress diversity and con-
flict, and visions of society which stress consensus and integration. This 
is because an integrated society can be understood as the necessary, but 
always uncertain, result of a process of integration. In order to be more 
concrete, I recall here the classical opposition between the two founding 
fathers of contemporary social thought, Durkheim himself, on the one 
hand, and Max Weber, on the other. Each of these two authors can be 
taken to represent one pole of the continuum I am trying to describe. 
We can say, simplifying things a little, that the difference between Weber 
and Durkheim has to do with the fact that, for the former, there can 
never be a moment of unanimous cohesiveness: the incommensurabil-
ity of the beliefs held in society permanently prevents such a stage being 
reached; any world-view tending to hegemony immediately produces 
its own contestation. By contrast, Durkheim did believe that there were 
moments of fusion in social life, which he termed moments of ‘collective 
effervescence’ (religious celebrations and rituals, public holidays, major 
cultural events, and the like), wherein the diverse members of society 
lose their individuality, adopt wholeheartedly the values of the collec-
tive, and thus turn into one.36 The excitation per se that accompany 
such moments can readily be described as a further notion of social 
tension in Durkheim’s thought. Equally interesting is the fact that, for 
Durkheim, the collective ideals which are at the same time the condi-
tion and the result of these moments of social excitation progressively 
lose their binding force, giving birth to individualization and differentia-
tion and bringing up the need for a renewed fusion of social elements. 
Thus social life, in this understanding, has a certain pulsating rhythm, in 
which phases of disaggregation are followed by moments of re-aggrega-
tion. At any rate, my point here is that despite their different emphases 
on conflict and integration respectively, tension, in both Weber’s and 
Durkheim’s models, is at the core of social life. In Weber’s case ten-
sion especially takes the form of contradictory forces existing between 
groups; but there are further phenomena which could be analysed from 
the viewpoint of tension: charisma, for instance, may be described as a 
kind of gravitational force exerted by the personality of a given indi-
36 See Hans Joas, ‘Kollektive Ekstase (Emile Durkheim)’, in Die Entstehung der 
Werte (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1997).
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vidual upon other individuals.37 In Durkheim’s case, I have mentioned 
three forms of tension: as excitement in moments of effervescence; as 
the constraint exerted by society upon individual minds; and as the pul-
sating rhythm of the social.
 Lastly, I have to clarify how all this relates to the notion of the 
‘third’ introduced above. Durkheim suggested that there is a social 
background of shared representations (norms, values, and the like) in 
every interaction. A subject pursuing a goal does not merely act in func-
tion of the (expected or actual) behaviour of other subjects involved in 
the action: rather, the kind of actions he or she may undertake and the 
kind of reaction he or she may expect are, at least in part, defined by the 
social context (cultural, intellectual, political or otherwise) in which the 
interaction is taking place.38 There are many different ways of spelling 
out this phenomenon. One is to emphasize the determination of actions 
by their social settings (as Durkheim, perhaps, and certainly others, 
did); another one consists in seeing a ‘culture’s causal significance’ in 
its ‘providing cultural components that are used to construct strategies 
of action’.39 Precisely these cultural elements represent the third I have in 
mind, and this third plays a crucial role in social interactions while at 
the same time remaining external to them. 
 What is interesting for us is the fact that this notion of a properly 
social dimension which is always ‘in excess’ with respect to individual 
actions and interactions is often illustrated by way of further metaphors 
of tension. We may formulate the following working hypothesis: as 
long as social relations are described as taking place on a single plane 
(this is the case, for instance, of Hobbes’s state of nature), mechanistic 
37 See Max Weber, ‘Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft’, in Gesammelte 
Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1985), pp. 481-88.
38 An important feature of the social thought of Jürgen Habermas is his belief that, 
under certain circumstances, social and cultural contexts may stop constitut-
ing a mere background to individual actions: they may be turned into an object 
of reflection, questioned, evaluated, and even transformed. All this happens, as 
it were, within a kind of social and moral void: a void that Habermas fills by 
invoking the common ground of reason.
39 Swidler, p. 273. The contrast between the theories I am discussing here and the 
culturalism I mentioned earlier in this essay is that the former clearly suggests 
that agents actively select and mobilize cultural elements. Culture is seen here as 
a ‘ “tool kit” of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use 
in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems’ (ibid.; emphasis 
mine, JT).
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and physical metaphors of society reign supreme; society is compared, 
for example, to a field of forces or to a clockwork without intention-
ality, centre or hierarchy. By contrast, the theories of the social which 
emphasize the symbolic, the cultural, typically make use of images that 
are more organic and, as it were, more elevated: society is described as 
a person, as a self-regulating organism, as an entity whose members 
manipulate symbols located in an ethereal, meta-social space.40 Cru-
cially, society is seen as having more than one dimension, it is vertical 
as well as horizontal, with complex, web-like relations existing between 
the elements located on different planes. It is precisely this assumption 
concerning multiple social planes or levels which renders an important 
metaphor of social life possible: the metaphor of suspension,41 which is 
obviously one of the many forms of tension in the sense in which I am 
using the term here. I have in mind here a particularly famous image of 
the social, proposed by Clifford Geertz: 
Believing [...] that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs and the analysis of it to 
be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpre-
tive one in search of meaning.42
40 Carl Schmitt observed that Hobbes, in his Leviathan, had recourse (confusingly, 
Schmitt believed) to mechanical as well as to organic metaphors of the social. 
From the perspective adopted in this essay, this ‘confusion’ could possibly be bet-
ter understood as a reflection of the specificity of Hobbes’s position concerning 
the nature of the third present in all social relations: this figure is clearly present, 
but within a rationalistic and mechanistic framework which many more recent 
theories of the social precisely sought to overcome. See Carl Schmitt, Der Levia-
than in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politi-
schen Symbols (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2003).
41 Note that this metaphor, in its typical form, does not envisage social agents as 
suspended on a single string, but simultaneously on a variety of them: this is the 
image of entanglement.
42 Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture’, 
in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 3.
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V.
It is undeniable that the notion of tension – even before any theoreti-
cal effort to sharpen and strengthen its meaning with a view to trans-
form it into a concept useful for analyses in the human sciences – exerts 
a distinct ‘spell’, to borrow a term from Wittgenstein.43 At first sight, 
this spell may have to do with the sheer extension of the term’s mean-
ing, insofar as it entails a number of rich connotations which pertain 
to a variety of fields – from the technological (electric tension) to the 
aesthetic (suspense) and to the sexual (excitation, arousal). However, 
tension seems to be capable, to use a term from classical psychology, of 
‘taking hold’ of our imagination not only because of the sheer quantity 
of its possible uses and associations, but also because of some intrin-
sic quality common to all these uses and associations, a quality which 
bestows the notion of tension with a particular weight, a particular viv-
idness, a particular attractiveness. The situations, objects, images, which 
we associate with tension seem to relate to some sectors of our experi-
ence which are perceived or believed to be fundamental in one way or 
another. 
 In order to account for this intuitive feeling, it is tempting to 
suggest that the weight of the notion of tension has something to do 
with the fact that it resonates with some universal aspects of our way 
of inhabiting the world as embodied beings of a particular kind – e.g. 
beings whose most natural position is that of standing in erect position. 
However, when looking at tension from the viewpoint of social and 
political theory, one seems to detect a further possible explanation of 
the spell of tension. It is an important component of Durkheim’s sociol-
ogy that our most basic concepts and categories (such as time, space, 
force, class) owe part of their appeal to their origin in fundamental 
social experiences. What this essay may have shown is that something 
similar could perhaps be said of tension: the distinct spell of this notion 
may have something to do with the fact that it captures, and thereby 
discloses, something which is at work, secretly or not, in most forms of 
life in common. 
43 Ludwig Wittgenstein said that we are ‘guided by the rules as by a spell’. See 
Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), § 234.
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